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Induction by enumeration has a clear interpretation within the numerical paradigm of inductive
discovery (i.e., the one pioneered by E. M. Gold (1967, Inform. and Control 10, 447–474)). The
concept is less easily interpreted within the first-order paradigm discussed by K. T. Kelly (1996, “The
Logic of Reliable Inquiry,” Oxford Univ. Press, New York) and E. Martin and D. Osherson (1998,
“Elements of Scientific Inquiry,” MIT Press, Cambridge, MA), in which the scientist’s data amount to
the basic diagram of a structure. We formulate two kinds of enumerative induction that are appropriate to
the first-order paradigm and analyze their potential for discovery. Among other results, it is shown that
one form of enumerative induction achieves maximum inductive competence. C° 2001 Elsevier Science
1. INTRODUCTION
Enumerative induction may be illustrated by the following game pitting you against Nature. Let N
be the natural numbers, f0; 1; : : :g. Nature chooses a set S from the collection A D fN ¡ fxg j x 2 N g.
She then presents you with an arbitrary enumeration of S. Upon examining each newly presented
number, you issue a member ofA with the goal of stabilizing to S. One way to proceed is to make your
own enumeration of A. Then at each stage you conjecture the first member of your enumeration that
includes the finite set of numbers encountered so far. (Thus, if your enumeration puts N ¡fig in the i th
position, your conjecture after seeing 5; 1; 0 would be N ¡ f2g). Such is “induction by enumeration”
or “enumerative induction,” and it is easy to see that in this case it works: no matter which member
S of A is chosen by Nature, and no matter the order in which its numbers are presented to you, your
conjectures will be right cofinitely often; that is, you will stabilize to S. Moreover, you will succeed in
this way no matter how you enumerate A.
The foregoing strategy appears to be the lowest form of inductive life with a semblance of intelligence.
So one is curious to determine its scope and limits. There are problems like those above—in which the
hypotheses form a countable collection of subsets of N—that can be solved but not by enumerative induc-
tion. On the other hand, if the hypotheses form a countable collection of total functions from N to N then
enumerative induction always works. These facts are verified straightforwardly.2 The theory of enumer-
ative induction is more challenging when projected into a recursion theoretic setting, in which inductive
strategies must be implementable via computer. Aspects of the resulting theory are presented in [6].
The inductive problems evoked so far have a numerical cast since Nature’s choice ranges over subsets
of N or over functions from N to N . In contrast, the goal of the present work is to explore enumerative
induction within the “first-order” paradigm discussed in [8, 12] and elsewhere. The latter paradigm
1 We offer warm thanks to two generous referees for their constructive remarks on an earlier draft, particularly, for spotting
an error in the original proofs of Propositions 28 and 72. The work was supported by the Australian Research Council Grant
A49803051.
2 For a solvable problem that cannot be solved via enumeration, consider fN ¡ f0 ¢ ¢ ¢ ng j n 2 N g). See [12, p. 30, Ex. 43] for
discussion.
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conceives Nature as choosing among disjoint collections of relational structures and can be shown
to include the numerical framework as a special case (see [12, Sects. 3.1.5, 3.5.6]). We here leave
computational issues to one side in order to focus on the pure logic of enumerative induction.
In what follows we first review the concepts needed to define the first-order paradigm of scientific (or
“inductive”) inquiry. Next we specify two kinds of inductive strategies, each of enumerative character.
The powers of the two strategies are then analyzed and compared. Among other things we show that
one of them is a canonical form for inductive inference: any solvable problem can be solved via the
method.
2. PRELIMINARIES
All the material in the present section is drawn from [12, Sects. 3.1, 3.2]. The paradigm we define is
similar to other classification tasks involving learning, e.g., those discussed in [3, 13]. In each case, the
learner must determine the category from which an underlying reality is drawn, and need not necessarily
determine the specific identity of that reality.
2.1. Language and Structures
To get started we fix a countable set Sym consisting of predicates and function symbols of various
arities, along with constants. The (denumerable) set fvi j i 2 N g of variables in Sym is denoted by Var.
The resulting set of first-order formulas is denoted Lform. The set of basic formulas (atomic formulas
along with their negations) is denotedLbasic. Both Sym and Var should be conceived as fixed throughout
our discussion. However, the theorems below sometimes require special hypotheses on Sym (typically,
that it include predicates of various arities). When stated without such hypotheses, our results are true
for any choice of (countable) Sym.
To interpret our language we rely on countable structures with signature appropriate to Sym. The
countability assumption is not essential to our paradigm, but simplifies the discussion. (For extension to
structures of arbitrary countability, see [12, Sect. 3.7]). Once again; structures are henceforth assumed
to have countable domains (either finite or infinite). The domain of structure S is denoted by jSj.
Let 0 µ Lform be given. We say that structure S is a model of 0 just in case there is an assignment
h : Var ! jSj with S jD 0[h]; in this case S satisfies 0. The class of all structures that satisfy 0 is
denoted by MOD(0).
2.2. The First-Order Paradigm
Before giving formal definitions, let us provide an overview of the paradigm. It is conceived as a game
between Nature and a scientist. The same partition of a given collection of structures is communicated
to both players. Each cell is considered to be a proposition, that is, a collection of possible worlds
(structures). Nature chooses a structure S from one of the propositions of the partition. She also chooses
an assignment h : Var!jSj onto jSj (that h be onto is crucial). Then she fixes an arbitrary enumeration
of ffl 2 Lbasic jS jD fl[h]g, the set of all basic formulas made true in S by h. The scientist is fed this
enumeration one formula at a time. After each input, she conjectures a proposition of her choice. The
scientist wins the game if cofinitely many of her conjectures are accurate. She “solves” the problem
posed by the game if she is guaranteed to win regardless of Nature’s choices.
Discussion of the paradigm along with variants is available in [12, Chap. 3]. Now for the formalities.
Propositions and Problems
1. DEFINITION. A nonempty class of structures is a proposition. A problem is a collection of disjoint
propositions.
2. EXAMPLE. Suppose that Sym consists of a binary predicate R. Let T be the theory of total orders
(with respect to R) with either a least point or a greatest point (but not both). Let µ D 9x8y Rxy (“there
is a least point”) and P D fMOD(T [ fµg);MOD(T [ f:µg)g. Then P is a problem consisting of the
propositions MOD(T [ fµg) and MOD(T [ f:µg).
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In this example P is composed of propositions that are elementary classes, that is, specified by sets
of sentences. Propositions are arbitrary collections of structures, however, and problems need not have
elementary members.
Environments
3. DEFINITION. Let structure S be given. A full assignment to S is any mapping of Var onto jSj.
A full assignment h to S may be conceived as providing temporary names for all the elements of jSj.
These names are exploited for the purpose of presenting the basic diagram of S to the scientist. The
presentation is called an environment, defined as follows.
4. DEFINITION. Let structure S and full assignment h to S be given.
(a) An environment for S and h is a sequence e such that range(e)Dffl 2 Lbasic jS jD fl[h]g.
(b) An environment for S is an environment for S and h, for some full assignment h to S.
(c) An environment is an environment for some structure.
(d) An environment for proposition P is an environment for some S 2 P:
(e) An environment for problem P is an environment for some P 2 P.
5. EXAMPLE. Let binary predicate R be the only member of Sym, and suppose that structure S with
jSj D N interprets R as<. If full assignment g to S is f(v2i ; i); (v2iC1; i) j i 2 N g then one environment
for S and g begins this way:
v2 D v3 :Rv4v5 Rv1v9 v9 D v9 Rv7v19 v0 6D v3 :Rv33v2 :Rv23v8 : : : :
If P is the proposition containing every strict total order, then this same environment is for P . If P is a
problem that includes P as a component proposition, then the environment is also for P.
6. DEFINITION. Given environment e and k 2 N , e(k) denotes the member of e that falls in its kth
position, and e[k] is the initial finite segment of e of length k. Thus e(k) comes right after e[k] in e.
Thus, if e is the environment of Example 5, then e(2)D Rv1v9, e[2]Dhv2D v3;:Rv4v5i, e(0)D
(v2D v3), and e[0] D ;.
The following lemma provides a sense in which environments offer complete information about the
structures they are for. The proof is easy (and also an immediate consequence of [7, Proposition 3.2(i)]).
7. LEMMA. Let structures S and T be given.
(a) If S and T are isomorphic then the set of environments for S is identical to the set
of environments for T .
(b) If some environment is for both S and T then S and T are isomorphic.
Data
8. DEFINITION. Let SEQ denote the collection of proper initial segments of any environment. The
set of elements appearing in ¾ 2 SEQ is denoted by range(¾ ).
Thus, SEQ is the countable set of all consistent finite sequences of basic formulas. It exhausts the
potential data that can become available to scientists. Given ¾ 2 SEQ, we denote byV ¾ the conjunction
(in order of appearance in ¾ ) of the formulas in range(¾ ). If ¾ D;, thenV ¾ is taken to be 8v0(v0 D v0).
9. DEFINITION. Let¾ 2 SEQ be given. We say that¾ is for proposition P just in caseV ¾ is satisfiable
in some member of P . We say that ¾ is for problem P just in case ¾ is for some P 2 :P.
Thus, ¾ is for a problem P just in case there is S 2SP that satisfies V ¾ .
INDUCTION BY ENUMERATION 53
Scientists. A scientist is represented by any partial or total mapping of SEQ into subclasses of
structures. That is, if scientist9 is defined on ¾ 2 SEQ, then9(¾ ) is a collection of structures and thus
a proposition.3
Success. The definition that follows requires scientists to reach stable belief in the one true propo-
sition of P, namely, the proposition that includes the structure presented to the scientist.
10. DEFINITION. Let scientist 9 be given.
(a) Let environment e for proposition P be given. We say that 9 solves P in e just in case for
cofinitely many k, 9(e[k])D P . We say that 9 solves P just in case 9 solves P in every environment
for P .
(b) Let problem P be given. We say that 9 solves P just in case 9 solves every member of P. In
this case we say that P is solvable, and otherwise unsolvable.
Unraveling the definitions, we see that solving P requires solving every P 2 P in every environment
for P . Equivalently, 9 solves P just in case for every P 2P, every S 2P, and every environment e for
S , there are cofinitely many k such that 9(e[k]) D P .
For example, the problem P specified in Example 2 is solvable, as will be seen in Example 17. In
contrast, it can be shown that the problem whose cosets are all structures of given (countable) cardinality
is not solvable. For the latter fact, and many other examples of solvable and unsolvable problems,
see [12].
2.3. Tip-Offs and Solvability
We now state a necessary and sufficient condition for solvability that will be central to our analysis
of enumerative induction. The condition requires the following definition.
11. DEFINITION. By a … -set is meant any collection of 8 formulas all of whose free variables are
drawn from the same finite set. Let problem P and P 2 P be given. A tip-off for P in P is a countable
collection t of … -sets such that:
(a) for every S 2 P and full assignment h to S, there is … 2 t with S jD … [h];
(b) for all U and P 0 with P 0 2P, U 2 P 0, and P 0 6D P , all full assignments g to U , and all … 2 t ,
U 6jD … [g].
If every member of P has a tip-off in P, then we say that P has tip-offs.
The following theorem is proved in [12, Sect. 3.2].
12. THEOREM. A problem is solvable if and only if it is countable and has tip-offs.
3. TWO KINDS OF INDUCTION BY ENUMERATION
To implement enumerative induction in the first-order paradigm, the first idea might be as follows.
Given a countable problem P, fix an enumeration E of the propositions in P. Then for any ¾ 2 SEQ for
P, conjecture the E-first proposition that is consistent with ¾ . It is clear, however, that this strategy fails
to solve P of Example 2 since both members of P are consistent with every ¾ for P.
3.1. Discrete Enumerative Induction
Given a problem P, a more promising method works as follows. First, a set of formulas is enumerated.
Then for any ¾ 2 SEQ, the first formula ˆ is sought such that MOD(V ¾ ^ ˆ) \SP is a nonempty
subset of some P 2P. This P is conjectured. Intuitively, the scientist proceeds down the ordering of
formulas, looking for the first one that (in conjunction with the data ¾ ) picks out an admissible conjecture
i.e., a member of P. Generalizing this idea slightly leads to the following definition.
3 More precisely, 9(¾ ) is a proposition unless 9(¾ ) D ;, since by Definition 1 propositions are non-null. We have denied the
status “proposition” to the empty set in order to simplify the formulation of subsequent theorems and definitions.
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13. DEFINITION. Let problem P be given, and let O be a well ordering of a set of formulas. We define
the scientist 1[P; O] as follows. Let ¾ 2 SEQ be given.
Case 1. There exists a first ˆ 2 O such that:
(*) for some P 2 P; ; 6D
n
S 2
[
P j
^
¾ ^ ˆ is satisfiable in S
o
µ P:
Then this P is unique (since the members of P are disjoint), and 1[P; O] D P .
Case 2. There is no ˆ 2 O that satisfies (*). Then 1[P; O] is undefined.
Let X µ Lform be given. We define the discrete X-type of P as follows. If for every well-ordering O of a
subset of X , the scientist1[P; O] does not solve P, then the discrete X -type of P is undefined. Otherwise,
the discrete X -type of P is the first ordinal fi such that for some well-ordering O of a subset of X ,
(a) the well order type of O is fi, and
(b) 1[P; O] solves P.
The definition holds the promise of a bidimensional classification of solvable problems. Given a
problem’s discrete X -type, one dimension records the quantifier complexity figuring in the formulas of
X . The other records the lowest ordinal (if there is one) needed to arrange X successfully. It will turn
out, however, that both dimensions collapse considerably and that not every solvable problem can be
sucessfully approached by discrete enumerative induction [see Proposition 60].
3.2. Segmental Enumerative Induction
To define a more successful kind of enumerative induction we must allow the scientist to pick out
propositions via infinite sets of formulas (the discrete version offers just one formula at a time). For this
purpose we rely on the following notation.
14. DEFINITION. Let O be a well ordering of a set of formulas. Let ¾ 2 SEQ and initial segment s of
O be given. We denote by satform(s; ¾ ) the set of satisfiable formulas of the formV ¾ ^ˆ , whereˆ 2 s.
Thus, satform(s; ¾ ) gathers together all the formulas in the segment s of O that are consistent with
¾ . Such sets are useful because of the following (easy) fact.
15. LEMMA. Let problem P be given; and let O be a well ordering of a set of formulas. Let ¾ 2 SEQ
also be given. Then there is at most one P 2P such that for some initial segment s of O; ; 6D fS 2S
P j satform(s; ¾ ) is satisfiable in Sg µ P.
So, given a problem P and an ordering O of formulas, the scientist can search in O for the first initial
segment s such that satform(s; ¾ ) picks out a proposition in P. This is the idea behind the following
definition.
16. DEFINITION. Let problem P be given, and let O be a well ordering of a set of formulas. We define
the scientist 9[P; O] as follows. Let ¾ 2 SEQ be given.
Case 1. There exists an initial segment s of O such that:
(**) for some P 2 P; ; 6D
n
S 2
[
P j satform(s; ¾ ) is satisfiable in S
o
µ P:
Then by Lemma 15 this P is unique and we set 9[P; O] D P .
Case 2. There is no initial segment s of O that satisfies (**). Then 9[P; O] is undefined.
Let X µ Lform be given. We define the segmental X-type of P as follows. If for every well-ordering
O of a subset of X , the scientist9[P; O] does not solve P, then the segmental X -type of P is undefined.
Otherwise, the segmental X -type of P is the first ordinal fi such that for some well-ordering O of a
subset of X ,
(a) the well order type of O is fi, and
(b) 9[P; O] solves P.
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It is not immediately evident how to compare the inductive powers of discrete versus segmental
methods. Given an ordering O , initial segment s of O , and ¾ 2 SEQ, satform(s; ¾ ) may be inconsistent
and thus be useless for picking out propositions. Perhaps there are solvable problems for which this
difficulty arises inevitably. But in fact such is not the case; we will see that every solvable problem can
be solved via segmental enumerative induction.
For notational simplicity, we denote the class of universal formulas by 8, and similarly for other
quantifier prefixes. Observe that both the discrete and segmental types of unsolvable problems are
undefined (and if either is defined, the problem is solvable). We will see later that the discrete type of
some solvable problems is also undefined.
17. EXAMPLE. Let P be as in Example 2. Given n 2 N , set ˆ2n D 8y Rvn y and ˆ2nC1 D 8x Rxvn .
Let E D fˆn j n 2 N g. Then both 1[P; E] and 9[P; E] solve P. Indeed, let S 2 MOD(T [ fµg), full
assignment h toS, and environment e forS and h be given (the proof is parallel ifS 2 MOD(T [ f:µg)).
So there is least n0 2 N such thatS jD ˆ2n0 [h] and there is k0 2 N such that for all n < 2n0,
V
e[k0]^ˆn
is inconsistent. Hence for all k ‚ k0, 2n0 is the least n 2 N such that
V
e[k] ^ ˆn is consistent. From
this it is easy to verify that for all k ‚ k0, 1[P; E](e[k]) D 9[P; E](e[k]) D MOD(T [ fµg), which
proves that both1[P; E] and9[P; E] solve MOD(T [ fµg) in e. Hence, both the discrete and segmental
8-types of P are bounded by !.
We can exploit the example to make a useful point about types. The formulas that fix a type might
require free variables; there may be no comparable ordering of sentences (closed formulas) that allows
enumerative induction to proceed. The pitfall for sentences is that free variables may be needed to refer
to specific objects denoted by variables in an environment. This is illustrated in extreme form for the
discrete case by the next proposition. It shows that restriction to sentences can foreclose enumerative
induction for a problem where it might have been successfully applied.
18. PROPOSITION. Suppose that Sym consists of a binary predicate. Then there is a problem P such
that:
(a) the discrete 8-type of P is defined (hence P is solvable);
(b) the discrete Lsen-type of P is undefined.
Proof. Let R be the binary predicate of Sym. Let T be the theory of total orders (with respect
to R) with either a least point or a greatest point (but not both). Let µ D 9x8y Rxy. We show that
P D fMOD(T [ fµg);MOD(T [ f:µg)g, satisfies the claim of the proposition. Clause (a) has been
proved in Example 17. We prove (b). Let O be any well ordering of some set X of sentences. If no
sentence in X is true in any member of
S
P, then1[P; O] D ; and we are done. Otherwise, let sentence
ˆ be the O-least member of X which is true in some S 2 SP. Suppose that S 2 MOD(T [ fµg) (the
proof is parallel if S 2 MOD(T [ f:µg)). Let ¾ 2 SEQ be for P. Because all the models of T are
infinite,
V
¾ is satisfiable in S; hence V ¾ ^ ˆ is satisfiable in S (since ˆ is closed). This shows that
for all ¾ 2 SEQ which are for P, either 1[P; O](¾ ) D MOD(T [ fµg) or 1[P; O](¾ ) is undefined.
Hence 1[P; O] does not solve MOD(T [ f:µg), so 1[P; O] does not solve P.
4. TIP-OFF BASES
To launch our investigation of discrete and segmental enumerative induction, a technical tool is
needed. It can be deployed when a problem enjoys tip-offs of a particularly simple character.
19. DEFINITION. Let set X of 8 formulas and problem P be given. We say that X is a tip-off base for
P just in case:
(a) for every S 2SP and full assignment h to S, there is ’ 2 X such that S jD ’[h];
(b) for all ’ 2 X , there is at most one P 2 P such that ’ is satisfiable in some member of P .
There are two natural classes of problems that often arise in the first-order paradigm. When solvable
they turn out to be distinguishable in terms of tip-off bases. The classes are defined as follows.
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20. DEFINITION.
(a) Let problem P, T µ Lsen, and µ0 ¢ ¢ ¢ µn 2 Lsen be given. We say that P has the form
(T ; fµ0 ¢ ¢ ¢ µng) just in case:
i. for every model S of T there is exactly one i 2 f0 ¢ ¢ ¢ ng such that S jD µ i ;
ii. P D fMOD(T [ fµ i g) j 0 • i • ng.
(b) Let T µ Lsen be given. We say that problem P has the form (T ; fP0; P1; : : :g) just in case
P D fP0; P1; : : :g and
S
P D MOD(T ).
Problems of both forms are discussed extensively in [12]. For present purposes the relevant facts are
given in the next two lemmas.
21. LEMMA. Every solvable problem of form (T ; fµ0 ¢ ¢ ¢ µng) has a tip-off base.
Proof. Let a solvable problem of form (T ; fµ0 ¢ ¢ ¢ µng) be given. By [12, Theorem 55, p. 81], for all
m• n, µm is equivalent in T to an 98 sentence. It follows easily that the problem has a tip-off base.
22. LEMMA. No infinite problem of form (T ; fP0; P1; : : :g) has a tip-off base.
Proof. Let T µ Lsen and disjoint propositions P0; P1 : : : be such that MOD(T ) D SfPi j i 2 N g.
Suppose for a contradiction that set X D f’i j i 2 N g of 8 formulas is a tip-off base for P D fP0; P1 : : :g.
For all i 2 N , letˆi be the conjunction of the universal closure of:’0^¢ ¢ ¢^:’i¡1 with the existential
closure of ’i . Trivially:
For all i; j 2 N ; if i 6D j then MOD(ˆi ) \MOD(ˆ j ) D ;: (23)
Let P 2 P and S 2 P be given. By Definition 19(a), there is least i 2 N such that ’i is satisfiable in
S. Hence ˆi is true in S 2 P . By Definition 19(b), ’i is satisfiable in no P 0 2 P with P 0 6D P . Hence
ˆi is false in all members of P 0 2 P, P 0 6D P . Since P is infinite, this proves that:
There are infinitely many i 2 N with MOD(T [ fˆi g) 6D ;: (24)
Moreover, since
S
P D MOD(T ), the preceding facts imply:[
fMOD(T [ fˆi g) j i 2 N g D MOD(T ): (25)
From (23) and (24), we infer that T [ f:ˆ0 ¢ ¢ ¢ :ˆi g is satisfiable for all i 2 N . With compactness,
this implies that T [ f:ˆi j i 2 N g is satisfiable, which contradicts (25).
Now we can begin to harness the concept of tip-off base. The next proposition shows that every
problem with a tip-off base lends itself easily to enumerative induction of the discrete kind.
26. PROPOSITION. Let set X of 8 formulas be a tip-off base for problem P. Then for every
enumeration E of 8 formulas with X µ range(E); the scientist 1[P; E] solves P.
Proof. Let X be a tip-off base for P, and let E D f’i j i 2 N g be an enumeration of 8 formulas with
X µ range(E). Let P 2 P, S 2 P , full assignment h to S, and environment e for S and h be given. We
will show that 1[P; E] solves P in e, thus proving that 1[P; E] solves P.
By Definition 19, there is least i0 2 N such that:
(a) S jD ’i0 [h], and
(b) ’i0 is satisfiable in no P 0 2 P with P 0 6D P .
Let k0 2 N be such that for all i • i0, if S jD :’i [h] then
V
e[k0] jD :’i . By the choice of i0:
(a) for all i < i0 and all k ‚ k0, if
V
e[k] 6jD :’i then ’i is satisfiable in at least two structures
taken from two distinct propositions in P;
(b) for all k ‚ k0, range(e[k]) [ f’i0g is satisfiable in S 2 P , and ’i0 is satisfiable in no member
of P 0, for all P 0 2 P, P 0 6D P .
This implies immediately that for all k ‚ k0, 1[P; E](e[k]) D P . So 1[P; E] solves P in e.
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From Lemma 21 and Proposition 26 it is easy to derive the following.
27. COROLLARY. Let solvable problem P of form (T ; fµ0 ¢ ¢ ¢ µng) be given. Then for every
enumeration E of all 8 formulas; the scientist 1[P; E] solves P.
The corollary reveals that discrete enumerative induction is strikingly easy for problems of the form
(T ; fµ0 ¢ ¢ ¢ µng). There is no need for an astute choice of formulas nor for a clever way to order them.
Any !-ordering of the universal formulas does the trick.
Proposition 26 informs us that the existence of a tip-off base is a sufficient condition for the solvability
of a problem via discrete enumerative induction. But it is not necessary. As shown by the next proposition
(whose proof is deferred to Section 6), there are problems without a tip-off base that can nevertheless
be solved via enumerative induction of the discrete kind.
28. PROPOSITION. Suppose that Sym consists of a unary function symbol and a constant. Then there
is a solvable problem P with the following properties.
(a) P has no tip-off base.
(b) The discrete 8-type of P is defined.
The problem to be exhibited in the proof of Proposition 28 has infinite discrete 8-type. The next
proposition shows this to be no accident.
29. PROPOSITION. Every problem with finite discrete 8-type has a tip-off base.
Proof. Let problem P with finite discrete 8-type be given. Let finite enumeration E of 8 formulas
be such that1[P; E] solves P. Define X to be the set of all formulas of formV ¾ ^’, ¾ 2 SEQ, ’ 2 E ,
satisfying the following:
there is at most one P 2 P such that
^
¾ ^ ’ is satisfiable in some member of P: (30)
It suffices to show that X is a tip-off base for P. By (30) this is proved if we show that for all S 2SP
and full assignments h to S , there is ˆ 2 X with S jD ˆ[h]. So let P 2 P, S 2 P , and full assignment
h to S be given. Since 1[P; E] solves P, there is k0 2 N and ’ 2 E such that:
for all k ‚ k0; ; 6D
n
T 2
[
P
flflfl^ e[k] ^ ’ is satisfiable in T o µ P: (31)
We derive immediately from (31) that V e[k0] ^ ’ belongs to X . Hence it suffices to show that S jD
(V e[k0] ^ ’)[h]. From (31) again we infer that V e[k] ^ ’ is satisfiable for all k 2 N . Hence by
compactness, range(e) [ fV e[k0] ^ ’g is satisfiable. Since V e[k0] ^ ’ is a 8 formula and e is an
environment for S and h, this implies that S jD (V e[k0] ^ ’)[h], as required.
5. FINITE TYPES
Discrete enumerative induction has an elementary character if it involves ordering no more than a
finite number of universal formulas. We expect problems solvable by such a method to be simple in
some combinatorial sense. Proposition 29 satisfies this expectation; problems with finite discrete 8-type
enjoy tip-off bases in the sense of Definition 19. Does the same kind of simplicity characterize problems
solvable by segmental enumerative induction over a finite ordering of universal formulas? The answer
is affirmative because the same class of problems is at issue. Indeed, the next proposition shows that for
every n 2 N , the discrete 8-type of a problem is n if and only if the segmental 8-type of the problem is
also n. (We subsequently show that all of these types are populated).
32. PROPOSITION. For all problems P; the discrete 8-type of P is finite iff the segmental 8-type of P
is finite. Moreover; if finite; they are equal.
Proof. Let problem P be given. The discrete 8-type of P is equal to 0 iff the segmental 8-type of P
is equal to 0 iff P D ;. So suppose P 6D ;. If P consists of a sole proposition, and if this proposition
is the class of all structures, then it is easy to verify that the discrete and segmental 8-types of P are
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both equal to 1. So suppose otherwise. It suffices to show that if the discrete 8-type of P is equal to
p > 0, then the segmental 8-type of P is at most equal to p, and if the segmental 8-type of P is equal to
p > 0, then the discrete 8-type of P is at most equal to p. Let n 2 N and enumeration E D f’i j i • ng
of 8 formulas be such that 1[P; E] solves P. We show that 9[P; E] solves P, thus proving that if the
discrete 8-type of P is finite, then the segmental 8-type of P is at most equal to the latter. Let P 2 P,
S 2 P , full assignment h to S, and environment e for S and h be given. It suffices to show that9[P; E]
solves P in e. Since 1[P; E] solves P (and E is finite), there is k0 2 N and n0 • n such that:
for all k ‚ k0; ; 6D
n
T 2
[
P
flflfl^ e[k] ^ ’n0 is satisfiable in T o µ P: (33)
In particular, (33) implies that V e[k] ^ ’n0 is satisfiable for all k 2 N . Hence by compactness,
range(e) [ f’n0g is satisfiable. Since ’n0 is a 8 formula and e is an environment for S and h, we infer
that S jD ’n0 [h]. Let X be the set of all ’ 2 f’0 ¢ ¢ ¢’n0g such that S jD ’[h]. We have thus shown that
’n0 2 X . With (33), this implies that:
for all k ‚ k0; ; 6D
n
T 2
[
P
flflfl range(e[k]) [ X is satisfiable in T o µ P: (34)
Let k1 ‚ k0 be such that for all ’ 2 f’0 ¢ ¢ ¢’n0g ¡ X ,
V
e[k1] jD :’. Then for all k ‚ k1 and for
all initial segments s of E , fV e[k] ^ ’ j’ 2 f’0 ¢ ¢ ¢’n0g ¡ Xg \ satform(s; e[k]) D ;. With (34), this
implies that for all k ‚ k1, 9[P; E](e[k]) D P . Hence 9[P; E] solves P in e, as required.
Conversely, let n 2 N and enumeration E D f’i j i • ng of 8 formulas be such that 9[P; E] solves
P. For all i • n, denote by ˆi the disjunction of all the conjunctions of subsets of f’0 ¢ ¢ ¢’ng whose
cardinality is equal to nC 1¡ i (conjunctions are written in ascending order of indexes of the ’i ’s). For
instance:
ˆ0 D
^
i•n
’i ; ˆ1 D
_
i•n
^
j•n
j 6Di
’ j ; and ˆn D
_
i•n
’i :
Note that all of the ˆi ’s are 8 formulas. Set F D fˆi j i • ng. We show that 1[P; F] solves P, thus
proving that if the segmental 8-type of P is finite, then the discrete 8-type of P is at most equal to the
latter. Let P 2 P, S 2 P , full assignment h to S, and environment e for S and h be given. It suffices
to show that 1[P; F] solves P in e. Since 9[P; E] solves P (and E is finite), there is k0 2 N and
X µ f’0 ¢ ¢ ¢’ng such that:
for all k ‚ k0; ; 6D
n
T 2
[
P
flflfl range(e[k]) [ X is satisfiable in T o µ P: (35)
Since by hypothesis P does not consist of a sole proposition equal to the class of all structures, it is clear
from Definition 16 that:
X 6D ;: (36)
Moreover, (35) implies that range(e[k])[ X is consistent for all k 2 N . Hence by compactness,
range(e)[ X is satisfiable. Since X is a set of 8 formulas and e is an environment for S and h,
we infer that S jD X [h]. Let YC (respectively Y¡) be the set of all ’ 2 f’0 ¢ ¢ ¢’ng such that S jD’[h]
(respectively S 6jD ’[h]). We have thus shown that:
X µ YC: (37)
Set i0 D card Y¡. By (36) and (37), i0 • n. By a finite pigeon hole argument it follows easily that:
(38) (a) for all i < i0, every subset of f’0 ¢ ¢ ¢’ng whose cardinality is equal to n C 1 ¡ i has a
nonempty intersection with Y¡;
(b) YC is the only subset of f’0 ¢ ¢ ¢’ng whose cardinality is equal to n C 1¡ i0 which has an
empty intersection with Y¡.
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Let k1 ‚ k0 be such that for all ’ 2 Y¡,
V
e[k1] jD :’. It follows immediately from (38) and the
definition of the ˆi ’s, i • n, that:
(39) (a) for all i < i0 and k ‚ k1,
V
e[k] ^ ˆi is unsatisfiable;
(b) for all k ‚ k1,
V
e[k] ^ ˆi0 is equivalent to
V
e[k] ^V YC.
From (35), (37), and (39), we infer that 1[P; F](e[k]) D P for all k ‚ k1. Hence 1[P; F] solves P in
e, as required.
For every n 2 N , the problems with discrete 8-type equal to n are the same as those with segmental
8-type equal to n. This is the content of the preceding proposition. The proposition would not be infor-
mative if there were no such problems. But the finite types are in fact rich, as the next proposition reveals.
40. PROPOSITION. Suppose that Sym D ;. For all n 2 N there is a problem whose discrete and
segmental 8-types are n.
Proof. The empty problem satisfies the claim of the proposition for n D 0. Given n > 0, denote
by ’n the sentence 8x0 ¢ ¢ ¢ xn(
W
0•i< j•n xi D x j ) (“there are at most n elements”). For all n > 0, let
Pn be the class of structures whose cardinality is n. Let n > 0 be given. By Proposition 32 it suffices
to show that the problem P D fP1 ¢ ¢ ¢ Png has discrete 8-type equal to n. Set E D f’1 ¢ ¢ ¢’ng. We
first show that 1[P; E] solves P, thus proving that the discrete 8-type of P is at most equal to n. Let
1 • m • n and environment e for Pm be given. It suffices to show that 1[P; E] solves Pm in e. Let
k0 2 N be such that
V
e[k0] implies that there are at least m distinct elements in the domain of the
underlying structure. Trivially, for all k ‚ k0,
V
e[k] ^ ’p is unsatisfiable for all 1 • p < m, and
; 6D fS 2 SP j V e[k] ^ ’m is satisfiable in Sg µ Pm . Hence for all k ‚ k0, 1[P; E](e[k]) D Pm . So
1[P; E] solves Pm in e, as required.
We now show that the discrete 8-type of P is at least equal to n, thus completing the proof. Let m > 0
and enumeration F D fˆ1 ¢ ¢ ¢ˆmg of 8 formulas be such that 1[P; F] solves P. It suffices to show
that n • m. Suppose that sequence f¾p j 1• p• ng of members of SEQ and function f : f1 ¢ ¢ ¢ ng !
f1 ¢ ¢ ¢mg satisfy:
(41) (a) for all 1 • p < n, ¾p µ ¾pC1;
(b) for all 1 • p • n, ; 6D fS 2SP j V ¾p ^ ˆ f (p) is satisfiable in Sg µ Pp.
Since the Pp’s are pairwise disjoint, it is easy to see that f is one-to-one, which implies that n • m. So
we only have to build a sequence f¾p j 1 • p • ng of members of SEQ and a function f : f1 ¢ ¢ ¢ ng !
f1 ¢ ¢ ¢mg that satisfy (41). We proceed by induction on p. For p D 1 let e1 be an environment for
P1. Since 1[P; F] solves P there is k 2 N and 1 • i • m such that ; 6D fS 2
S
P j V e1[k] ^
ˆi is satisfiable in Sg µ P1. Set ¾1 D e1[k] and f (1) D i . Observe that ¾1 is an initial segment of an
environment for P1. For the induction step p > 1 suppose that ¾1 ¢ ¢ ¢ ¾p¡1 and f (1) ¢ ¢ ¢ f (p ¡ 1) have
been defined and that ¾p¡1 is an initial segment of an environment for Pp¡1. Let environment e for Pp
be given, extending ¾p¡1; there is such an environment since the cardinality of structures in Pp is greater
than that for structures in Pp¡1. Since 1[P; F] solves P, there is k > length(¾p¡1) and 1 • i • m
with ; 6D fS 2 SP j V e[k] ^ ˆi is satisfiable in Sg µ Pp. Set ¾p D e[k] and f (p) D i . We see that
f¾p j 1 • p • ng and f satisfy (41).
The proofs of Propositions 32 and 40 depend on the intimate connection between universal formulas
and environments for a structure; any such formula false in the structure is inconsistent with each of
its environments. (This is because the assignments underlying environments are required to be onto;
see Definition 4.) One might hope that enumerative induction based only on finitely many formulas
reduces to the case where all the formulas involved are 8. But matters are not so simple. Indeed, it will
be seen below that there are problems whose discrete and segmental 89 and 98-types are 2 although
their 8-types are not finite. Can anything general be said about finite types in this broader context? We
can report only the following fact about the coincidence of finite types across the discrete–segmental
divide. Here the quantifiers of enumerated formulas are not constrained at all.
42. PROPOSITION. For all problems P; if the segmental Lform-type of P is finite then the discrete
Lform-type of P is finite.
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Proof. Let problem P have finite segmentalLform-type. Let enumeration E D f’0 ¢ ¢ ¢’ng of formulas
be such that 9[P; E] solves P. Without loss of generality we can suppose that ’0 D (x D x). Denote
by F the enumeration of f’i0 ^ ¢ ¢ ¢ ^ ’i p j p 2 N ; 0 • i0 < ¢ ¢ ¢ < i p • ng in lexicographical order.
(For instance, if n D 5 then ’0 ^ ’2 comes before ’0 ^ ’2 ^ ’3, which comes before ’2.) It suffices to
show that 1[P; F] solves P. Let P 2 P, S 2 P , full assignment h to S, and environment e for S and
h be given. It suffices to show that 1[P; F] solves P in e. Since 9[P; E] solves P (and E is finite and
begins with (x D x)), there is m • n and nonempty X µ f’0 ¢ ¢ ¢’mg such that the following holds for
cofinitely many k:
(43) (a) ; 6D fT 2SP j range(e[k]) [ X is satisfiable in T g µ P;
(b) for all ; 6D X 0 ‰ X , fT 2SP j range(e[k]) [ X 0 is satisfiable in T g 6µ P;
(c) for all p • m, if ’p 62 X then
V
e[k] ^ ’p is not satisfiable.
Let ˆ 2 F be the conjunction of all members of X (written in ascending order of indexes of the ’i ’s).
Let ´ 2 F come before ˆ in F . By the definition of F there are two cases:
Case 1. There exists p • m such that ’p occurs in ´ but not in ˆ . Then by (43.c),
V
e[k] ^ ´ is
unsatisfiable for cofinitely many k.
Case 2. For all p • n, if’p occurs in´ then’p occurs inˆ . Since all members of P are pairwise dis-
joint, it then follows from (43)a,b that for cofinitely many k, fT 2 SP jV e[k]^´ is satisfiable in T g 6µ
P 0 for all P 0 2P.
By (43.a) and the definition of ˆ , ; 6D fT 2SP j V e[k]^ˆ is satisfiable in T g µ P for cofinitely
many k. We conclude from the preceding facts that 1[P; F](e[k]) D P for cofinitely many k. Hence
1[P; F] solves P in e, as required.
6. INFINITE TYPES
The results of the previous section show that the discrete and segmental 8-types coincide in the finite
case. Does this situation extend to the infinite, and if so, for which ordinals? We will derive the following
answer: when both are defined, the two kinds of 8-types coincide, and they are never greater than!. The
following proposition covers much of the distance to this result and provides other useful information.
44. PROPOSITION. For every solvable problem P; there exists a set X of 8 formulas such that for
every enumeration E of X; the scientist 9[P; E] solves P.
Proof. Let solvable problem P D fPj j j 2 N g be given. For all j 2 N let tj be a tip-off for Pj in
P. By the countability of tip-offs, let the … -sets in
S
j2N tj be enumerated as f…i j i 2 N g. For all i 2 N
fix an enumeration f’ni j n 2 N g of …i . Then set:
X D '¡’00 ^ ¢ ¢ ¢ ^ ’n00 ¢ _ ¢ ¢ ¢ _ ¡’0i ^ ¢ ¢ ¢ ^ ’nii ¢ flfl i; n0 ¢ ¢ ¢ ni 2 N“:
Denote by E any enumeration of X . Since X consists of 8 formulas, to prove the proposition it suffices
to show that9[P; E] solves P. Let j 2 N , S 2 Pj , full assignment h to S, and environment e for S and
h be given. It suffices to show that 9[P; E] solves Pj in e. Let i0 2 N be least such that S jD …i0 [h].
For i < i0, S 6jD …i [h], so for each i < i0 we may choose c(i) 2 N such that:
(45) (a) S jD (’0i ^ ¢ ¢ ¢ ^ ’c(i)¡1i )[h];
(b) S 6jD ’c(i)i [h].
Since for all i < i0, ’c(i)i is a 8 formula, and since h is onto jSj, it follows from (45.b) that there is
k0 > 0 such that:
for all k ‚ k0 and for all i < i0;
^
e[k] ^ ’c(i)i is unsatisfiable: (46)
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Let Y D f(’00 ^ ¢ ¢ ¢ ^ ’n00 ) _ ¢ ¢ ¢ _ (’0i ^ ¢ ¢ ¢ ^ ’nii ) j i < i0; n0 ‚ c(0) ¢ ¢ ¢ ni ‚ c(i)g. We deduce from
(46) that:
for all k ‚ k0 and for all ’ 2 Y;
^
e[k] ^ ’ is unsatisfiable: (47)
From (45) and the fact that S jD …i0 [h] it follows easily that S jD X ¡ Y [h]. So:
For all k ‚ k0; range(e[k]) [ (X ¡ Y ) is satisfiable: (48)
Let Z D f(’00 ^ ¢ ¢ ¢ ^ ’c(0)0 ) _ ¢ ¢ ¢ _ (’0i0¡1 ^ ¢ ¢ ¢ ^ ’
c(i0¡1)
i0¡1 ) _ (’0i0 ^ ¢ ¢ ¢ ^ ’ni0 ) j n 2 N g. From (46) we
obtain range(e[k]) [ Z jD f’ni0 j n 2 N g (D…i0 ) for all k ‚ k0. Hence, since Z µ X ¡ Y :
for all k ‚ k0; range(e[k]) [ (X ¡ Y ) jD …i0 : (49)
For k 2 N , let E(e[k]) be the set of satisfiable formulas of the form V e[k] ^ ˆ , ˆ 2 E (as in
Definition 14). It follows immediately from (47), (48), and (49) that:
for all k ‚ k0; E(e[k]) is consistent and E(e[k]) jD …i0 : (50)
We infer from 50 that for all k ‚ k0, there is an initial segment s of E such that ; 6D fT 2S
P j satform(s; e[k]) is satisfiable in T g µ Pj . It follows immediately from Definition 16 that for
all k ‚ k0, 9[P; E](e[k]) D Pj . Hence 9[P; E] solves Pj in e, as required.
We see from the proposition that segmental enumerative induction using 8 formulas is a universal
strategy of inference: every solvable problem can be solved this way. Moreover, designing a successful
agent of this kind requires no more than specifying the right set X of 8 formulas. No further insight is
required for their ordering since any enumeration will do the job.
A similar order-independence characterizes discrete enumerative induction using 8 formulas; and the
ordinal is again bounded by !. But it is necessary to qualify this fact by the proviso that the discrete
8-type be defined for the problem in question; for, we will soon see solvable problems with undefined
discrete types at every level of quantifier complexity. The discrete parallel to the preceding proposition
can thus be stated as follows.
51. PROPOSITION. Let solvable problem P have defined discrete 8-type. Then there exists a set X
of 8 formulas such that for every enumeration E of X; 1[P; E] solves P.
The proposition follows directly from the proof of the following lemma, of interest in its own right.
52. LEMMA. For all solvable problems P; the discrete 8-type of P is defined if and only if the
following condition holds:
(*) For all P 2 P; and all ¾ 2 SEQ for P; there is a 8 formula ’ such that ; 6D fS 2 SP jV
¾ ^ ’ is satisfiable in Sg µ P.
Proof. Let solvable problem P be given. For the “only if” direction, suppose that (*) does not
hold. Let P 2 P and ¾ 2 SEQ for P be such that for all 8 formulas ’, either fS 2 SP j V ¾ ^
’ is satisfiable in Sg D ; or fS 2 SP j V ¾ ^ ’ is satisfiable in Sg 6µ P . Then for all ¿ 2 SEQ
extending ¾ :
(53) for all 8 formulas ’, either fS 2 SP j V ¿ ^ ’ is satisfiable in SgD; or fS 2 SP j V ¿ ^
’ is satisfiable in Sg 6µ P .
Let environment e for P with ¾ µ e be given. Then (53) implies immediately that for every set X of
8 formulas, for every well ordering O of X , and for every k ‚ length ¾ , 1[P; O](e[k]) is undefined.
Hence 1[P; O] does not solve P in e, so 1[P; O] does not solve P. It follows that the discrete 8-type
of P is not defined.
For the “if” direction, suppose that (*) holds. Suppose that P 6D ; (otherwise the discrete 8-type of
P is trivially equal to 0). We will define a set X of 8 formulas and show that for every enumeration
E of X , 1[P; E] solves P. First we define X . Let • • ! and propositions Pj , j < • , be such that
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P D fPj j j < •g and for all j < j 0 < • , Pj and Pj 0 are distinct. Since P is solvable, for all j < •
let t j be a tip-off for Pj in P. By the countability of tip-offs, let the … -sets in
S
j<• t j be enumerated
as f…i j i 2 N g. Without loss of generality we can assume that for all i 2 N , …i is satisfiable in some
member of
S
P.
Let i 2 N be given. Fix an enumeration f’ni j n 2 N g of …i and an enumeration ffini j n 2 N g of
all fi 2 Lbasic such that …i jD fi. By the definition of tip-offs, and since Pj and Pj 0 are distinct for
all j < j 0 < • , there is a unique j < • such that …i is satisfiable in some member of Pj . Fix an
enumeration f¾ ni j n 2 N g of all ¾ 2 SEQ such that …i [ range(¾ ) is satisfiable in some member of Pj .
Let n 2 N be given. We define a formulaˆni as follows. It is easy to verify that there is ¾ 2 SEQ such that
range(¾ ) D ffi0i ¢ ¢ ¢fini g[range(¾ ni ) and ¾ is satisfiable in some member of Pj . Hence, ¾ is for Pj . By (*)
there exists a 8 formula ’ such that ; 6D fS 2SP jfi0i ^¢ ¢ ¢^fini ^ V ¾ ni ^’ is satisfiable in Sg µ Pj .
We choose one such 8 formula ’ and denote it by ˆni .
Given i; j; n0 ¢ ¢ ¢ ni 2 N , define the formula of form (i; n0 ¢ ¢ ¢ ni ) to be:¡
’00 ^ ¢ ¢ ¢^’n00
¢_ ¢ ¢ ¢_ ¡’0i¡1^ ¢ ¢ ¢^’ni¡1i¡1 ¢_‡fi0i ^ ¢ ¢ ¢ ^ finii ^^ ¾ nii ^ ˆnii · : (54)
Let X be the set of formulas of form (i; n0 ¢ ¢ ¢ ni ), i; n0 ¢ ¢ ¢ ni 2 N . Note that X consists of 8 formulas.
Let E be any enumeration of X . We show that 1[P; E] solves P. Let j < • , S 2 Pj , full assignment
h to S, and environment e for S and h be given. It suffices to show that 1[P; E] solves Pj in e. Let
i0 2 N be least such that S jD …i0 [h] (there must be such an i0 by the definition of the …i ’s). For i < i0,
S 6jD …i [h], …i is a set of 8 formulas and h is onto jSj. So for each i < i0 we may choose c(i); d(i) 2 N
such that:
(55) (a) S jD (’0i ^ ¢ ¢ ¢ ^ ’c(i)¡1i )[h];
(b) S 6jD ’c(i)i [h];
(c) S 6jD fid(i)i [h].
Since for all i < i0, ’c(i)i , fi
d(i)
i , and theˆni are 8 formula, and since h is onto jSj, it follows from (55.b,c)
and the definition of the ˆni that there is k0 > 0 such that the following holds.
(56) (a) For all k ‚ k0 and for all i < i0,
V
e[k] ^ ’c(i)i is unsatisfiable.
(b) For all k ‚ k0 and for all i < i0,
V
e[k] ^ fid(i)i is unsatisfiable.
(c) Let i < i0 and (unique) P 2 P be such that …i is satisfiable in some member of P . If
P 6D Pj then for all k ‚ k0 and n < d(i),
V
e[k] ^ fi0i ^ ¢ ¢ ¢ ^ fini ^
V
¾ ni ^ ˆni is unsatisfiable.
Let k ‚ k0 be given. Since S jD …i0 [h], we deduce from (55.a), (56), and the definition of the ˆni0 that
for all i; n0 ¢ ¢ ¢ ni 2 N , the following holds.
(57) (a) If 0 < i • i0 and if n0 < c(0) or : : : or ni¡1 < c(i ¡ 1), then the conjunction of V e[k]
with the formula of form (i; n0 ¢ ¢ ¢ ni ) is satisfiable in S.
(b) If i < i0 and if n0 ‚ c(0) and : : : and ni¡1 ‚ c(i ¡ 1) and ni ‚ d(i), then the conjunction
of
V
e[k] with the formula of form (i; n0 ¢ ¢ ¢ ni ) is not satisfiable.
(c) If i < i0 and if n0 ‚ c(0) and : : : and ni¡1 ‚ c(i ¡ 1) and ni < d(i), then the conjunction
of
V
e[k] with the formula of form (i; n0 ¢ ¢ ¢ ni ) is either not satisfiable or satisfiable in some member
of Pj .
(d) If i D i0 and if n0 ‚ c(0) and : : : and ni¡1 ‚ c(i ¡ 1), then the conjunction ofV e[k] with
the formula of form (i; n0 ¢ ¢ ¢ ni ) is either not satisfiable or satisfiable in some member of Pj .
(e) If i > i0 then the conjunction ofV e[k] with the formula of form (i; n0 ¢ ¢ ¢ ni ) is satisfiable
in S.
By (57), for all ’ 2 X , if there is P 2 P with ; 6D fT 2SP jV e[k]^’ is satisfiable in T g µ P then
P D Pj . So to finish the proof it suffices to exhibit ’ 2 X such that:
; 6D
n
T 2
[
P
flflfl ^ e[k] ^ ’ is satisfiable in T o µ Pj : (58)
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Since S jD …i0 [ range(e[k])[h], there is n 2 N such that e[k] D ¾ ni0 . We infer immediately from (56.a)
and the definition of ˆni0 that ’ D (’00 ^ ¢ ¢ ¢ ^ ’
c(0)
0 ) _ ¢ ¢ ¢ _ (’0i0¡1 ^ ¢ ¢ ¢ ^ ’
c(i0¡1)
i0¡1 ) _ (fi0i0 ^ ¢ ¢ ¢ ^
fini0 ^
V
¾ ni0 ^ ˆni0 ) satisfies (58), as required.
The lemma also allows us to derive Proposition 28, whose proof was deferred.
Proof of Proposition 28. Let s be the function symbol and ¯0 the constant of Sym. For n 2 N , let n¯
be the result of n applications of s to ¯0. Set:
P0 D MOD(fn¯ 6D ¯0 j n > 0g):
For all n > 0, set:
Pn D MOD(fm¯ 6D ¯0 j 0 < m < ng [ fn¯ D ¯0g):
We claim that P D fP0; P1 : : :g witnesses the proposition.
Clearly, for all i 2 N , Pi 6D ; and for all distinct i; j 2 N , Pi \ Pj D ;, hence P D fP0; P1 : : :g is an
infinite problem. It is equally immediate that P is solvable, and that
S
P is the class of all structures.
So (a) follows directly from Lemma 22.
It remains to show (b). Let P 2 P and ¾ 2 SEQ be for P . By Lemma 52 it suffices to show that for
some 8 formula ’:
; 6D
n
S 2
[
P
flflfl ^ ¾ ^ ’ is satisfiable in So µ P: (59)
If P D Pn for some n > 0 then’ D (
V
0<m<n(m¯ 6D ¯0))^(n¯ D ¯0) satisfies (59). Suppose that P D P0. We
can choose 0 < m < n such that range(¾ )[f p¯ 6D q¯ j 0 • p < q < ng[fn¯ D m¯g is consistent. Moreover,
by a simple induction on terms of the form p¯, f p¯ 6D q¯ j 0 • p < q < ng [ fn¯ D m¯g jD f p¯ 6D ¯0 j p > 0g.
Hence ’ D (V0•p<q<n( p¯ 6D q¯)) ^ (n¯ D m¯) satisfies (59).
Let us now show that the “if defined” qualification in Proposition 51 cannot be eliminated. Indeed,
the following result shows that discrete enumerative induction cannot always be made to work no matter
what formulas are involved. So, unlike its segmental counterpart, discrete enumerative induction is not
a universal method of inquiry within the first-order paradigm.
60. PROPOSITION. Suppose that Sym consists of a denumerable set of constants. Then there exists a
solvable problem whose discrete Lform-type is undefined.
Proof. Let fn¯ j n 2 N g enumerate the constants of Sym. Set P0 D MOD(fn¯ D ¯0 j n 2 N g). Let
P1 be the class of all structures that do not belong to P0. We show that P D fP0; P1g satisfies
the claim of the proposition. Obviously, P is solvable. It remains to prove that for no well order-
ing O of a subset of Lform does 1[P; O] solve P. So let O well order a subset of Lform. Choose
T 2 MOD(fn¯ D ¯0 j n 2 N g [ f9x(x 6D ¯0)g) ‰ P0. Fix an environment e for T . To finish the proof we
show that 1[P; O] does not solve P0 in e.
There exists k0 2 N such that
V
e[k0] jD 9x(x 6D ¯0). Let k ‚ k0 be given, and let ˆ be any formula
such that
V
e[k] ^ ˆ is satisfiable. Let n 2 N be such that n¯ does not appear in V e[k] ^ ˆ . SinceV
e[k] jD 9x(x 6D ¯0), fV e[k]^ˆ; n¯ 6D ¯0g is consistent. HenceV e[k]^ˆ is satisfiable in some member
of P1. So we have shown that for every k ‚ k0 and for every formula ˆ , if
V
e[k] ^ ˆ is satisfiable
then fS 2 SP j V e[k] ^ ˆ is satisfiable in Sg 6µ P0. By Definition 13 this implies immediately that
for cofinitely many k, either 1[P; O](e[k]) is undefined or 1[P; O](e[k]) 6µ P0. Hence 1[P; O] does
not solve P0 in e.
We summarize the relation between discrete and segmental enumerative induction using universal
formulas by the following consequence of Propositions 32, 44, and 51:
61. COROLLARY. Let solvable problem P be given. The segmental 8-type of P is ! at most. If defined;
the discrete 8-type of P is ! at most; and equal to its segmental 8-type.
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Proposition 60 provides an example of a solvable problem whose discrete Lform-type is undefined
and hence not finite. The following proposition shows that there is, in fact, a rich collection of solvable
problems with nonfinite Lform-types.
62. PROPOSITION. Let solvable problem P be such that every ¾ 2 SEQ for P is for at least two
members of P. Then the discrete Lform-type of P is not finite.
Proof. Suppose for a contradiction that there is n 2 N and enumeration E D f’0 ¢ ¢ ¢’ng of formulas
such that1[P; E] solves P. We will build by induction on i a sequence f¾i j i 2 N g of members of SEQ
that are for P, a sequence fPi j i 2 N g of members of P, and a total function f : N ! f0 ¢ ¢ ¢ ng such
that for all i 2 N :
(63) (a) f (i) is the least m • n such that ; 6D fS 2 SP j V ¾i ^ ’m is satisfiable in Sg µ P for
some P 2 P;
(b) ¾i µ ¾iC1;
(c) ; 6D fS 2SP jV ¾i ^ ’ f (i) is satisfiable in Sg µ Pi ;
(d) Pi 6D PiC1.
Before we build those items, we show how to derive a contradiction from (63), thus completing the
proof. Let i0 2 N be such that range( f ) µ f f (0) ¢ ¢ ¢ f (i0)g. Then:
for all i0 • i1 • i2; f (i1) • f (i2): (64)
Proof of (64). Let i0 • i1 • i2 be given, and suppose for a contradiction that f (i2) < f (i1). By
(63.a) applied twice, since f (i2) 2 f f (0) ¢ ¢ ¢ f (i0)g there exists j • i0 such that ; 6D fS 2
S
P j V ¾ j ^
’ f ( j) is satisfiable in Sg µ P for some P 2 P, ; 6D fS 2
S
P j V ¾i2 ^ ’ f (i2) is satisfiable in Sg µ
P for some P 2 P, and f ( j) D f (i2). Hence
V
¾i2 ^ ’ f (i2) is satisfiable and ; 6D fS 2
S
P jV
¾ j ^ ’ f (i2) is satisfiable in Sg µ P for some P 2 P. Since j • i1 • i2, it follows from (63.b) that
¾ j µ ¾i1 µ ¾i2 . Thus:
; 6D
n
S 2
[
P
flflfl ^ ¾i1 ^ ’ f (i2)is satisfiable in So µ P for some P 2 P: (65)
But (63.a) applied to i D i1 implies that f (i1) is the least m • n such that ; 6D fS 2
S
P j V ¾i1 ^
’m is satisfiable in Sg µ P for some P 2 P. This contradicts (65) together with the hypothesis that
f (i2) < f (i1).
Now we use (64) to obtain the desired contradiction. Since all members of P are pairwise disjoint, we
infer from (63.b–d) that for all i 2 N , ’ f (i) 6D ’ f (iC1). Hence (since range( f ) is finite) there is i1 ‚ i0
with f (i1 C 1) < f (i1), which contradicts (64).
So to finish the proof we build f¾i j i 2 N g, fPi j i 2 N g, and f : N ! f0 ¢ ¢ ¢ ng satisfying (63).
Let P be any member of P. Fix an environment e for P . Since 1[P; E] solves P, there exists k > 0
such that m • n is least with ; 6D fS 2 SP j V e[k] ^ ’m is satisfiable in Sg µ P 0 for some P 0 2 P,
and ; 6D fS 2 SP j V e[k] ^ ’m is satisfiable in Sg µ P . Set ¾0 D e[k], P0 D P , and f (0) D m.
Note that ¾0 is for P. Let i 2 N be given, and suppose that ¾0 ¢ ¢ ¢ ¾i , P0 ¢ ¢ ¢ Pi , and f (0) ¢ ¢ ¢ f (i) have
been defined and that ¾i is for P. By hypothesis there exists P 2 P such that P 6D Pf (i) and ¾i is for
P . Let environment e for P extend ¾i . Since 1[P; E] solves P, there exists k ‚ length(¾i ) such that
m • n is least with ; 6D fS 2 SP j V e[k] ^ ’m is satisfiable in Sg µ P 0 for some P 0 2 P, and
; 6D fS 2 SP j V e[k] ^ ’m is satisfiable in Sg µ P . Set ¾iC1 D e[k], PiC1 D P , and f (i C 1) D m.
Plainly this construction satisfies (63).
To appreciate the import of Proposition 62, consider again the problem P defined in our running
Example 2. It is easy to verify that P satisfies the conditions of the proposition. Hence, P does not have
finite discreteLform-type. From Proposition 42 it follows that P does not have finite segmentalLform-type
either. On the other hand, Example 17 shows P to have discrete and segmental 8-types bounded by !.
The upshot is that P can be solved via enumerative induction of both the discrete and segmental kind,
but infinitely many formulas are required for this purpose. The following proposition summarizes the
situation.
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66. PROPOSITION. Let P be as in Example 2. Then the discrete and segmental 8-types of P are both
!. The same is true of their Lform-types.
7. EXISTENTIAL, 89-, AND 98-TYPES
Once again, let P be as in Example 2. Although P can be solved by enumerative induction, infinitely
many formulas are required for this purpose. In particular, Proposition 66 shows that no reduction in
number is achieved by increasing the quantifier complexity of the enumerated formulas. This raises
the general question: is the discrete, universal type of a problem the lowest possible, and similarly for
segmental types? In the present section we provide a negative answer by exhibiting problems whose
universal types are either undefined or greater than their 89- and 98-types.
As a preliminary, let us ask whether simply switching from universal to existential formulas can lower
the type of a problem. In the discrete case the answer is No, as revealed by the following proposition.
67. PROPOSITION. For all solvable problems P; if the discrete 9-type of P is defined then the discrete
8-type of P is 1 at most.
Proof. Let nonempty, solvable problem P be given (if P D ; then the 8-type of P is 0). Suppose
that the discrete 9-type of P is defined. Let well ordering O of set X of 9 formulas be such that1[P; O]
solves P. Let P 2 P and environment e for P be given. Let k0 2 N be such that 1[P; O](e[k0]) D P .
Then there is ’ 2 X such that ; 6D fS 2 SP j V e[k0] ^ ’ is satisfiable in Sg µ P . Since ’ is an
9 formula, there is k1 ‚ k0 such that
V
e[k1] jD ’. This implies immediately that for all k ‚ k1,
; 6D fS 2 SP j V e[k1] ^ (x D x) is satisfiable in Sg µ P . Hence 1[P; fx D xg] solves P, and the
discrete 8-type of P is equal to 1.
In contrast to the debility of existential formulas, we now give a sense in which the ascent to 89
formulas allows maximal improvement in type. By Corollary 61, the worst universal types are ! in
the segmental case, and undefined in the discrete case. Except in trivial cases, the best discrete and
segmental 89-types are 2. The following proposition shows there to be problems that simultaneously
have the worst 8-types and the best 89-types.
68. PROPOSITION. Suppose that Sym consists of a denumerable set of constants and a binary predi-
cate. Then there is a solvable problem such that:
(a) the discrete 8-type of P is undefined;
(b) the segmental 8-type of P is infinite;
(c) the discrete and segmental 89-types of P are 2.
Proof. Let fn¯ j n 2 N g enumerate the constants of Sym, and let R be its binary predicate. Let
P0 consist of all members of MOD(fn¯ D ¯0 j n 2 N g) in which the interpretation of R is a strict total
order without greatest point. Let P1 consist of all finite members of
S
n>0 MOD(n¯ 6D ¯0) in which the
interpretation of R is a strict total order. Then P D fP0; P1g is a solvable problem. We show that
P satisfies the claim of the proposition, starting with (a). Let satisfiable 8 formula ’ be such that
’ jD 9x(x 6D ¯0). Let X be the set of all n > 0 such that n¯ does not appear in ’. Denote by n0 the least
member of X . By the choice of ’, f’; n0 6D ¯0g is consistent. Hence W D f’; n0 6D ¯0g[fn¯ D n0 j n 2 Xg
is consistent. Choose structure S and full assigment h to S with S jD W [h]. Let A µ jSj be the union
of fh(x) j x 2 Var(’)g with the set of interpretations of the constants n¯, n 2 N . Let T be the restriction
of S to A. Since 8 formulas are preserved in substructures, W is satisfiable in T . Note that jT j is finite,
and T jD (n0 6D ¯0). Hence T 2 P1. So we have shown the following:
Every satisfiable 8 formula that implies 9x(x 6D ¯0) is satisfiable in some member of P1: (69)
Now let e be an environment for a structure S in P0 that satisfies S jD 9x(x 6D ¯0). Let k0 2 N be such
that
V
e[k0] jD 9x(x 6D ¯0). It follows from (69) that for all 8 formulas ’ and for all k ‚ k0, eitherV
e[k]^’ is unsatisfiable orV e[k]^’ is satisfiable in some member of P1. This implies immediately
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that for all well orderings O of some set of 8 formulas and for all k ‚ k0, 1[P; O](e[k]) 6D P0. Hence
for all well orderings O of some set of 8 formulas, 1[P; O] does not solve P0 in e. Hence the discrete
8-type of P is undefined.
Clause (b) follows immediately from clause (a) and Propositions 44 and 32. For clause (c), set E D
f8x9y Rxy; x D xg. If e is an environment for P0, then trivially 1[P; E](e[k]) D 9[P; E](e[k]) D P0
for all k 2 N . Let environment e for P1 be given. Let n > 0 and k0 2 N be such that
V
e[k0] jD (n¯ 6D ¯0).
Then trivially,1[P; E](e[k]) D 9[P; E](e[k]) D P1 for all k ‚ k0. So both1[P; E] and9[P; E] solve
P, and the discrete and segmental 89-types of P are 2 at most. They cannot be equal to 1. Indeed, let
ˆ 2 Lform be given. Suppose that1[P; fˆg] (respectively9[P; fˆg]) solves P. Let environment e0 for P0
be given. Then there exists k0 2 N such that ; 6D fS 2
S
P j V e0[k0]^ˆ is satisfiable in Sg µ P0. Let
environment e for P1 extend e0[k0]. Then for all k ‚ k0,1[P; fˆg](e[k]) (respectively9[P; fˆg](e[k]))
is not equal to P1.
Compared to 89, the ascent to 98 formulas does not yield quite the same improvement over universal
formulas. The reason is that a problem’s discrete 8-type is defined whenever its 98-type is defined.
There can thus be no strict analogy to Proposition 68 with 98 replacing 89.
70. PROPOSITION. For all solvable problems P; the discrete 98-type of P is defined iff the discrete
8-type of P is defined.
Proof. Let solvable problem P be given. Trivially, if the discrete 8-type of P is defined then the
discrete 98-type of P is defined. Suppose that the discrete 98-type of P is defined. Let set X of 98
formulas and well-ordering O of X be such that 1[P; O] solves P. Let P 2 P and ¾ 2 SEQ for P be
given. By Proposition 52 it suffices to exhibit a 8 formula ’ such that:
; 6D
n
S 2
[
P
flflfl^ ¾ ^ ’ is satisfiable in So µ P: (71)
Fix an environment e for P extending ¾ . Since 1[P; O] solves P, there is k ‚ length (¾ ) and ˆ 2 X
such that ; 6D fS 2 SP j V e[k] ^ ˆ is satisfiable in Sg µ P . Since ˆ is an 98 formula, we can
choose p 2 N , variables x1 ¢ ¢ ¢ x p, and 8 formula ´ such that fx1 ¢ ¢ ¢ x pg \ Var(
V
e[k] ^ ˆ) D ; and
jD 9x1 ¢ ¢ ¢ x p´ $ ˆ . Then ; 6D fS 2
S
P j V e[k] ^ ´ is satisfiable in Sg µ P , and ’ D V e[k] ^ ´
satisfies (71), as required.
In view of the last result and Corollary 61, what is the most drastic improvement to be hoped for by
using 98 formulas instead of universal ones? There might turn out to be a problem whose discrete and
segmental 8-types are infinite but whose respective 98-types are 2. The following proposition reveals
the existence of just such a problem.
72. PROPOSITION. Suppose that Sym consists of a binary predicate; a unary function symbol; and a
constant. Then there exists a solvable problem P such that:
(a) the discrete and segmental 8-types of P are infinite;
(b) the discrete and segmental 89-types of P are 2;
(c) the discrete and segmental 98-types of P are 2:
Proof. Let R be the binary predicate, s the function symbol, and ¯0 the constant of Sym. For n 2 N ,
let n¯ be the result of n applications of s to ¯0. Set:
T D f(n¯ D ¯0)! (9x8y Rxy ^ 8x9y Rxy) j n > 0g:
Set:
P0 D MOD(fn¯ 6D ¯0 j n > 0g):
For all n > 0 set:
Pn D MOD(T [ fm¯ 6D ¯0 j 0 < m < ng [ fn¯ D ¯0g):
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Clearly, for all i 2 N , Pi 6D ; and for all distinct i; j 2 N , Pi \ Pj D ;, hence P D fP0; P1 : : :g is an
infinite problem. It is equally immediate that P is solvable. We prove that P satisfies the claim of the
proposition, starting with (a). Since fn¯ 6D ¯0 j n > 0g jD T , it is easy to see thatSP D MOD(T ). Hence,
by Lemma 22 and Propositions 29 and 61, it suffices to show that the discrete 8-type of P is defined.
Let P 2 P and ¾ 2 SEQ be for P . By Lemma 52 it suffices to show that for some 8 formula ’:
; 6D
n
S 2
[
P
flflfl ^ ¾ ^ ’ is satisfiable in So µ P: (73)
If P D Pn for some n > 0, ’ D (
V
0<m<n(m¯ 6D ¯0)) ^ (n¯ D ¯0) satisfies trivially (73). Suppose that
P D P0. We can choose 0 < m < n such that range(¾ ) [ f p¯ 6D q¯ j 0 • p < q < ng [ fn¯ D m¯g is
consistent. It is easy to verify that ’ D (V0•p<q<n( p¯ 6D q¯)) ^ (n¯ D m¯) satisfies (73).
We prove (b). Set E D f8x9y:Rxy; x D xg. Observe that every initial segment of an environment
for P is consistent with 8x9y:Rxy. Using this fact and the definition of T , it is easy to verify that if
e is an environment for P0, then 1[P; E](e[k]) D 9[P; E](e[k]) D P0 for all k 2 N . Let n > 0 and
environment e for Pn be given. Let k0 2 N be such that
V
e[k0] jD (
V
0<m<n(m¯ 6D ¯0)) ^ (n¯ D ¯0).
Then trivially, 1[P; E](e[k]) D 9[P; E](e[k]) D Pn for all k ‚ k0. So both 1[P; E] and 9[P; E]
solve P, and the discrete and segmental 89-types of P are 2 at most. They cannot be equal to 1. Indeed,
let ˆ 2 Lform be given. Suppose that 1[P; fˆg] (respectively 9[P; fˆg]) solves P. Let environment
e0 for P0 be such that range(e0) jD fm¯ 6D n¯ jm; n 2 N ; m 6D ng. Then there exists k0 2 N such that
; 6D fS 2 SP j V e0[k0] ^ ˆ is satisfiable in Sg µ P0. Let n > 0 be such that for all m ‚ n, m¯ does
not occur in
V
e0[k0]. Let environment e for Pn extend e0[k0]. Then for all k ‚ k0, 1[P; fˆg](e[k])
(respectively9[P; fˆg](e[k])) is not equal to Pn . This ends the proof of (b). The proof of (c) is similar,
using f9x8y : Rxy; x D xg instead of E .
8. CONCLUDING REMARKS
An important challenge in the theory of scientific discovery is to provide a motivated characterization
of problem difficulty. Within the numerical paradigm, one approach to such characterization counts the
number of times an hypothesis needs to be changed in the course of solving a problem; see, for example,
[9–11]. Other approaches include [1, 2, 5]. These perspectives are ingenious and well developed but
they are best suited to paradigms built around the recursivity of scientists and problems. Such is not the
case for the first-order paradigm studied in the present paper.
For the first-order paradigm, it seems natural to measure problem difficulty in terms of consumption
of an information resource. Segmental 8-types illustrate the idea if we take the complexity of prob-
lem P to be the smallest ordinal • such that P can be solved via segmental enumerative induction
using a •-ordering of universal formulas. (Such is indeed the definition of P’s segmental 8-type; see
Definition 16.) The difficulty for this approach is that Corollary 61 largely trivializes it. There turns out
to be just one level of infinite difficulty, concealing great differences in the intelligence needed to solve
its different members. In contrast, problems at finite levels all seem monotonously easy to solve. The
situation is even worse for the discrete case, since Lform-types in this sense may not even be defined
(see Proposition 60).
There nonetheless remain potentially interesting questions about enumerative induction. For one
thing, we would like to have a revealing characterization of the class of problems with discrete Lform-
types. By Corollary 27, this class includes all solvable problems of form (T ; fµ0 ¢ ¢ ¢ µng). By Lemma 21
and Proposition 28, there are yet other members, but we have no independent description of them. A
second question concerns the complexity of problems that do have discrete Lform-types. By Proposi-
tion 51, the complexity of problems with discrete 8-types is bounded by !. Is it similarly the case that
every problem with discrete Lform-type has Lform-type no greater than !?
On the more speculative side, our results are consistent with the existence of a subset X of Lform
yielding a rich and interesting class of segmental X -types that embraces all solvable problems. If the
set X were natural or had other interesting properties, it would provide a potentially useful measure of
problem complexity. In view of Corollary 61, X could not include all 8 formulas. But aside from this
constraint it is presently unclear what its composition might be.
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Perhaps something akin to induction by enumeration may yet prove useful for classifying problem
complexity. At present, however, a key idea appears to be missing.
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